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1 Introduction and summary
The European Securities Trading and Post-trading (Clearing and Settlement) Industries
have recently experienced a vast movement of consolidation. This was encouraged by
the European Commission, seeking to establish a single market for the trade of financial
securities across the European Union, and reduce the cost of cross-border transactions.
Somehow, this industry may face a competition problem similar to that encountered in
the telecom and transport sectors. For the regulator, the issue as a whole hinges on the
need to allow for the achievement of economies of scale, while avoiding the possibility that
an upstream monopolistic position might thwart competition in the downstream market,
i.e. banking activities or securities trading activities.
After a long discussion with the industry, the European Commission considered that
there was no need for regulation, provided that platforms adopted and implemented a
”Code of Conduct” supposed to prevent such anti-competitive behaviors. The objective
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of this article is to challenge this view by showing that such a ”Code of Conduct” may
not be enough.
Several recent academic studies confirm the importance of these questions and con-
clude that regulation plays a crucial role in preventing any abuse of a dominant position.
They recommend avoiding vertical integration among infrastructures and services, be it
in securities trading activities or banking services. However these theoretical models do
not try to figure out what should be the optimal regulation when complete separation
of activities cannot be avoided. They rather provides different insights on how far the
clearing and settlement industries differ from more traditional industries.
In order to address directly the issue of regulating such industries, we consider a model
where custodians are competing in order to provide both custody services and banking
services to investors. We assume that there is only one Central Security Deposit (CSD)
where all the net orders must be in the end settled. We assume therefore that each
custodian have an omnibus account in the CSD, for which they pay a fixed fee, and must
pay an additional fee for each transaction they cannot not internalize. Besides, we assume
also that the CSD is directly competing with other custodians for provision of custody
and banking services. This may result from a vertical integration between a CSD and one
custodian, or more simply by the CSD getting a banking licence. Such an entity may be
more efficient than custodians (due to technological improvement and/or internalisation
of some trades), but has the ability to exclude its rivals through prohibitive access prices.
A crucial assumption of our model is that it would be socially inefficient to let several
CSDs compete for the provision of depository and settlement services for a given security
(natural monopoly property). This comes from the property of increasing returns to
scale that seems to be confirmed by empirical analysis which are discussed in the next
section, but furthermore from the fact that we are in a competitive bottleneck situation
(see for example Bergman, 2003). Even though several CSDs compete, it would be total
uneconomical to have the same security deposited in several CSDs. Therefore when
final investors want to trade in a given security, they are obliged to access (directly or
indirectly) the (unique) CSD that provide notary services for this particular security. This
is analogous to the local loop in the telecom industry.
Different types of regulator may be considered, existing ones such as the European
commission, or new ones close to the regulating agencies which are already in place in
other industries (telecom, energy). While the former may only impose external constraints
on actors such as non-discriminatory access pricing or forbidding of integration, the latter
may resort to a combination of monitoring and incentive regulation in order to extract
information and impose a cost-based regulation. Although such a regulation may be very
difficult and costly, we do not restrict ourselves in the followings, and consider both types
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of regulation.
We first analyse the impact of vertical integration when the CSD is not for profit
(section 3), then determine what should be the optimal access price when the CSD is for
profit (section 4). In order to do that, we explicitly take into account the ability of both
the CSD and the custodians to internalize part of their transactions. We show that cost-
based regulation might restore social efficiency, but might also be difficult to implement.
Finally, we study the effect of a ”code of conduct” (section 5) and show that vertical
integration of platforms with banks, even with a code imposing non-discriminatory access
pricing and accounting separation, will typically not lead to a socially efficient industry
structure.
2 A Review of the academic literature
Let’s start by reviewing two empirical papers, among the very few available on the sub-
ject. Schmeidel et al.(2004) investigates the existence and extent of economies of scale
in depository and settlement systems. Their data set consists in the balance sheets and
income statements of 16 settlement institutions (including the two (I)CSDs) in Europe,
North America and Asia over the period 1993-2000. The authors estimate different regres-
sions (loglinear or translog) of total operating costs of these institutions over two outputs
variables (the number of settlement instructions and the value of securities deposited),
one input price variable, proxied by per capita GDP, a time trend and an (I)CSD dummy.
The results are not very conclusive, since the coefficients of the output variables are not
significant. However, the authors conclude that economies of scale are present, but that
they differ a lot by size and region of the settlement institutions (they are smaller for
large institutions and in the US). The (I)CSD dummy is positive and significant and the
time trend indicates improved cost effectiveness over the sample period.
Van Cayseele and Wuyts (2005) estimate a translog cost function for settlement and
safekeeping services (custody). They find that economies of scale are quickly exhausted,
while economies of scope are present. However, they don’t have any (I)CSD in their data
set, and they do not include the activities of custodian banks in their analysis. For these
two reasons, they are not able to answer the fundamental question, namely is an (I)CSD
more efficient (for providing jointly the services usually provided by CSDs and custodian
banks) than the CSD and the custodian bank taken separately?
Among theoretical papers the most relevant to our analysis is Holthausen and Tapking
(2004).This paper models competition between a CSD and a custodian bank for servicing
small banks, which can either become members of the CSD or else use the custodian
bank as an intermediary. The CSD and the custodian bank thus compete for offering
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conservation services, but the CSD is a monopoly on the settlement activity. The CSD
sets two prices: one for opening a securities account (depository function), the other for
trade settlement. The custodian bank reacts by setting its own prices for custody and
settlement. A relatively complex model is constructed to generate network externalities
and gains from netting trades between investors. However some investors also have needs
for additional services only provided by the custodian bank. As a result of the interaction
between network externalities and these exogenous preferences, the socially optimal allo-
cations are such that a majority of the investors chooses one of the providers (i.e. they are
not symmetric. But in the absence of regulation, the CSD is able to leverage its monopoly
power on settlement for attracting a majority of investors. This is because the CSD is
able to raise the cost of its competitor for providing services to final investors. However,
due to network externalities, the proportion of final users who hold direct accounts with
the CSD is not necessarily excessive, from a social welfare perspective. Hence there is no
clear case for regulating CSDs.
A number of other papers are also interesting but less directly relevant to our analysis.
For example two papers by Kauko (2002, 2003) study the strategic use of links between
CSDs as a way to commit not to charge too high fees for secondary market services. This
allows CSDs to increase their revenues from primary markets services. These papers,
although quite complex, are very interesting because they are the only ones (to date) to
model explicitly the two-sided nature of the industry, by taking into account the security
issuers as well as the investors. They show in particular that platforms are likely to
subsidize issuers and tax investors. Similarly, Tapking and Yang (2004) analyse different
forms of industry structures in a two country model with exchanges and CSDs: complete
separation (CS), vertical integration (VI) within each country, horizontal integration of
the two CSDs, either at the purely ”legal” level (LHI) or also at the technical level (THI).
They show that this last system dominates all the other and that VI is better than CS.
Due to the complementarily of the services provided by the exchanges and the CSDs,
horizontal merger is in fact pro-competitive. Koppl and Monnet (2003) also analyse the
impact of integration between CSDs an exchanges and arrive at very different conclusions.
They show that vertical silos can prevent efficiency gains from horizontal consolidation.
They claim that their results may explain the failure of the merger between DBorse and
the LSE.
Finally let’s mention three articles that do not contain any formal analysis but con-
tribute to the debate about the industrial organisation of the security industry. Knieps
(2004) tries to put forward the view that end custodians can be put in competition (he
claims that ”clearing and settlement are competitive services”) as long as the technical
regulatory function (i.e. the notary function)- is provided in a non discriminatory fashion.
Similarly Serifsoy and Weiss (2003) try to assess the pros and cons of different post mar-
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ket architectures and argue that contestable monopolies are the relevant paradigm. Van
Cayseele (2004) discusses possible anti-trust concerns and opposes two radical views: a
contestable quasi monopoly ”view and a ”regulated pan-European monopoly”. He argues
in favour of the first.
3 Vertical integration
We consider a model in the spirit of the one developed by Holthausen and Tapking (2003).
There is a unique CSD, two competing custodian banks labelled i = 1, 2, and a large
number of investors. The target of this chapter is to analyze the impact of vertical
integration when the CSD is not for profit and uses a cost-based fee structure. Two
stylized models of the clearing and settlement industry will be described in such a way,
depending on whether the CSD is integrated with one custodian or not.
The two custodian banks compete to provide differentiated services tailored to sat-
isfy the needs of final investors. This product differentiation dimension is captured by a
Hotelling model (a standard modelling tool in Industrial Organization, see for example
Tirole (1988)) where investors are located on a unit interval [0,1], and incur a transporta-
tion cost t per unit of distance when they choose to patronize one of the custodian banks,
located at the extremes of the unit interval. Each investor has a non increasing and convex
demand function q = D(p), and an associated (net) surplus function S(p) =
∫∞
p
D(s)ds.
The parameter t reflects the intensity of competition between custodian banks : the
higher t, the more differentiated the services offered by the two banks, and thus the less
competitive the downstream market.
First, assume that the CSD is independent of the two custodians and contracts with
each of them for the provision of settlement services. The cost structure is as follows:
the CSD incurs a set-up cost F and a marginal cost C for providing depository and
settlement services to custodian banks. Each custodian bank incurs a fixed cost f per
investor account, and a marginal cost c for providing complementary services to each of
his final consumers. We note also pi and ai respectively the per transaction fee and the
fixed fee charged by custodian bank i (i = 1, 2). This ”custodians model” is represented
in figure 1.
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Figure 1: Custodians model.
In this case, competition leads to a price structure that maximizes welfare :
Proposition 1 In the CSD model, if transportation costs are small enough so that all
the final investors are served, then :
• Per-transaction fees charged by custodian banks equal their total marginal cost p1 =
p2 = c+ C;
• Fixed fees charged by the custodian banks equals their fixed cost plus the differenti-
ation cost parameter a1 = a2 = f + t;
• This price structure achieves maximum social welfare;
• The market is equally shared between the two custodians who make a profit equal to
t
2
− F , while the average consumer surplus is equal to S(c+ C)− f − 5t
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All final investors are served as long as custodian’s profit is greater than the fixed
cost of installment ( t
2
> F ), and that the gross surplus of each final investor exceeds
the sum of fixed costs for maintaining the investor’s account with the bank, the margin
t of the custodian bank and the maximal transportation cost incurred among investors
(S(c+ C) > f + 3t
2
).
Secondly, consider an integrated model where the first custodian is replaced by the
CSD, either through a vertical integration as depicted below or because the CSD got
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a banking licence. We assume that the integration is accompanied by a decrease in
total marginal cost, due to the internalisation of some trades and/or technological im-
provements: the CSD is more efficient than the second custodian and incurs γ < c + C
marginal cost, while the second custodian still incurs the marginal cost C for access to
the CSD. This ”CSD vs custodian model” is represented in figure 2.
Figure 2: CSD vs custodian model.
In this case, competition leads to a suboptimal price structure that induces redistribu-
tive effects between different type of investors :
Proposition 2 In the CSD-custodian model, if transportation costs are small enough so
that all the final investors are served (see appendix for explicit conditions), then
• Per transaction prices charged by the CSD is lower than for bank 2, which keeps the
same as in the Custodians model. This favours brokers and dealers;
• The fixed fee charged by the CSD is higher than for bank 2, which is reduced in
comparison with the Custodians model. On average, this penalizes retail investors;
• Social welfare increases in comparison with the Custodians model, due to technical
improvement induced by vertical integration, but the price structure is suboptimal.
The price structure is suboptimal because the CSD raises its fixed fees in order to
increase its profit, at the expense of its market share which becomes suboptimal (since
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the CSD is more cost-efficient than the custodian). This result, as well as the two pre-
vious propositions, are a consequence of a more specific property whose proof is given in
appendix 7.1. This property, which is provided in the following lemma, applies to a more
schematic model where two custodians are competing while incurring the same fixed cost
f but possibly different marginal costs c1 ≤ c2. The difference between c1 and c2 reflects
the way the custodians access the CSD (c2 = c+C but, in the ”custodians model”, c1 = c2
while c1 = γ < c2 in the ”CSD vs custodian” model).
Lemma 1 Both at social optimum and at competitive equilibrium, per transaction fees
equal marginal costs p1 = c1 and p2 = c2. However, as soon as custodians do not face
the same marginal costs (c1 6= c2), the equilibrium market share xc of the most efficient
custodian is suboptimal at the competitive equilibrium :
xc =
1
2
+
∆S
6t
< x∗ =
1
2
+
∆S
2t
where ∆S = S(c1)−S(c2), reflecting the fact the most efficient custodian prefers to choose
higher fixed fees while a social planner would prefer to impose equal fixed fees a1 = a2 (at
the competitive equilibrium ai = f + t+ (−1)i+1∆S3 )
4 Access Price’s Regulation
If the CSD is for profit, as is well known from other industries, vertical integration may
lead to anticompetitive behavior including foreclosure. Indeed, if we assume that the CSD
can choose first its access price pa and then compete with the other custodian for service
delivery to final investors as represented in figure 3, it can be shown that the CSD will
raise significantly its access price in order to increase its rival’s cost, or even deny access
to the custodian if the elasticity of demand of final investors low enough (cf. appendix
7.3 for explicit computations).
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Figure 3: CSD internalization model.
Once the second custodian is excluded, which is represented in figure 4, the CSD will
raise its fixed fees in order to profit from its monopoly power. He may thus not serve
all the downstream market. In comparison with the custodians’ model discussed in the
previous section, the impact of integration on social welfare in this case is unclear since
the increase in technical efficiency due to the merger may still dominates the decrease
in competition. Anyway, regulators may be tempted to intervene in order to avoid the
exclusion of a fraction of final users.
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Figure 4: monopolistic model.
One way to do that is to keep an open access to the CSD and impose a ”reasonable”
access charge. Even if no information is hidden to the regulator (we will question this
assumption in the next section), the optimal access price is not straightformard because
the cost structure is endogeneous, due to the ability of the CSD to internalize a greater
fraction of its transactions.
For that reason, and in order to find out what should be the optimal access price, we
extend the previous model in order to take into account internalization. We first assume
that all custodian’s transactions need to be settled through the CSD : their total marginal
cost is therefore c+C (while CSD’s total marginal cost is equal to γ < c+C). This last
assumption will be relaxed at the end of this section.
We assume thereafter that it is not optimal for the social planner to exclude the
second custodian. This requires that the customer’s valuation for the differentiation of
services provided by the custodian banks is high enough1 and that installment cost F is
low enough. We then have the following result :
Proposition 3 Cost-based access price is optimal, i.e. pa = C maximizes social welfare.
This result is based on the assumption that no custodian can internalize part of its
transaction. For robustness, we analyze also what would be the optimal access-price
1the exact condition is S(γ)− S(c+ C) ≤ 1.8t, see appendix 7.2 for explicit computation.
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regulation when we depart from this assumption. In order to do that, we assume that the
volume of such transactions remains supposedly relatively small. This hypothesis reflects
the fact that multiple custodians may be facing the CSD, and that only transactions
settled between two investors belonging to the same custodian would be internalized by
this custodian.
More precisely, we assume thereafter that the CSD is facing n custodians (labeled
i = 1, ..., n) that must settle the major part of their transactions through the CSD. The
market is divided into n unit intervals [0, 1] with the CSD on one side, and one custodian
on the other side. By symmetry, at the equilibrium, the market share xi and the tarifs
(ai, pi) of each custodian will be the same, and we can thereafter omit the subscripts i.
The total market share of the CSD is denoted by nx0 where x0 is its market share on one
unit interval (hence x = xi = 1− x0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}). For simplicity, we assume also
that all CSD’s transactions are internalized with no additional cost (γ = c).
Figure 5: custodian’s internalisation model.
We denote by α the fraction of custodian’s transactions that must be settled through
the CSD. The remaining part 1−α of transactions, when securities are transferred between
two accounts of the same custodian bank, are internalized by the custodian. When one
custodian must settle a transaction, the other end of the transaction may be either with
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one of its clients, a CSD’s client or a client of one of the n−1 other custodians. Therefore,
on average, α = n−(1−x0)
n
.
When n is large enough, it can be shown that the optimal access price with respect
to social welfare is higher than the cost :
Proposition 4 In a CSD model with regulated access-prices and custodians’ internaliza-
tion, when the number of custodians is large enough, then the optimal regulated access
price is higher than the cost (p∗a > C)
The intuition behind this result is as follows. When choosing pa 6= C, there is a
tradeoff between two effects : a distorsion on the demand of final investors (pa = C is less
distorsive), and a change of the market share of the more cost-efficient CSD (pa > C is
more efficient). When the custodians do not internalize, the distorsion effect dominates
the efficiency effect, and p∗a = C. When they internalize part of their transactions, their
market share is more sensitive to the access price (a raise of pa decreases their market
share, and thus lower their ability to internalize, which increases their cost, and so on).
The efficiency effect then dominates the distorsion effect near pa = C and the optimal
access price is greater than C.
5 Code of conduct
A cost-based regulation is likely to be difficult to implement, due to the incentives of the
ICSD to hide (or manipulate) the information about its costs. Besides, in any case, due to
indirect externalities between different categories of users (namely with issuers), cost based
regulation is not even desirable. Lastly, a competition authority such as the DG COMP, is
not supposed to regulate prices. Let us consider the case where a competition authority
imposes a ”Code of conduct”. We follow here what was agreed and presented to the
EU Commissioner McCreevy on the 7th November 2006 by the European Association of
Central Counterparty Clearing Houses and the European Central Securities Depositories
Association. In our framework, this agreement can be summarized in the three following
constraints :
• non discriminatory access to the CSD;
• accounting separation between CSD and custodian bank 1;
• independent pricing decisions of the CSD and custodian bank 1.
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Figure 6: code of conduct.
The following proposition shows that the code of conduct achieve one of its target,
that is to avoid redistribution between different types of final investors, but lead to high
monopoly access price and inefficiency :
Proposition 5 The equilibrium under the ”code of conduct” leads to :
• equal prices for final investors
p1 = p2 = pa + c a1 = a2 = t+ f
• insufficient market share for the CSD
• monopoly access price
(pa + c)− 12 [γ + c+ C]
pa + c
=
1
η
6 conclusion
This paper is a first attempt to analyze the welfare effects of vertical integration between
a CSD and a custodian bank in the Clearing and Settlement Industry.
It shows that a move from the CSD model to the ICSD model is likely to entail a
change in the nature and the costs of settlement services (leading to a possible decrease in
per transaction fees) accompanied with a decrease in competition for providing services
to final users (leading, on average, to an increase in the fixed fees charged to investors).
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If vertical integration is allowed, it would be necessary to regulate access pricing, but
this would introduce new inefficiencies, due to the incentives of the ICSD to hide cost
information. The design of an optimal regulation would be even more complex when
indirect externalities are taken into account, since socially optimal prices then depend on
externalities between the different categories of users, and not only on costs .
Having several CSDs competing for issuers on one side (single homing) and offering
access to custodian banks on the other (multi-homing) could be a reasonable alternative,
since it would limit the need for regulation only on the investors side. However a formal
analysis remains to be done.
7 proof
7.1 vertical integration
Let us first consider the competitive equilibrium’s property described in lemma 1. The market
share of custodian i is :
xi =
1
2
+
1
2t
(S(pi)− S(pj) + aj − ai),
while its profit is given by :
pii = xi(ai − f + (pi − ci)D(pi))− F.
Social welfare is equal to
W = x1(S(p1)+ (p1− c1)D(p1))+ (1−x1)(S(p2)+ (p2− c2)D(p2))− t2(x
2
1+(1−x1)2)− f − 2F
Under competition, custodian’s profit maximization program can be solved either by choos-
ing the tarifs (pi, ai) or by choosing pi and the market share xi, since xi is equal, up to additive
and multiplicative constants, to S(pi)−ai. The partial derivative of the profit pii with respect to
pi, while maintaining xi constant, is equal to xi(pi−ci)D′(pi). Therefore, at a Nash equilibrium,
the variable fees must be equal to the marginal costs (pi = ci).
The profit of custodian i is maximized when ∂pii∂ai = xi− 12t(ai−f) = 0. Simple computations
give ai = 12(t+f+aj+(−1)i+1∆S) where ∆S = S(c1)−S(c2), and then ai = t+f+(−1)i+1 13∆S.
At the competitive equilibrium, the market share of the first custodian is thus
x1 =
1
2
+
∆S
6t
Social welfare is then equal to
Wc = ∆S(
1
2
+
∆S
6t
) + S(c2)− t2(
1
2
+
∆S2
18t2
)− f − 2F
or
Wc = S(c1)− ∆S2 +
5∆S2
36t
− f − 2F − t
4
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Those results are correct as long as the net surplus of each investor is positive, i.e. S(pi) ≥ ai+xit,
and as long as custodians’ profit are positive, i.e. xi(ai − f) > F . Those two relations are
respectively equivalent to
S(c1) + S(c2)
2
>
3
2
t+ f
and
1− ∆S
3t
≥
√
2F
t
.
Let us now consider the social optimum. Using the same previous arguments, variable fees
must be equal to marginal costs. Besides, fixed fees must be chosen in order to have x1 ∈
argmax(x1S(c1) + (1 − x1)S(c2) − t2(x21 + (1 − x1)2)). Simple computation gives the optimal
market share for the first custodian :
x∗1 =
1
2
+
∆S
2t
which is obtained by choosing a1 = a2. Social welfare is then equal to
W ∗ = ∆S(
1
2
+
∆S
2t
) + S(c2)− t2(
1
2
+
∆S2
2t2
)− f − 2F
or
W ∗ = S(c1)− ∆S2 +
∆S2
4t
− f − 2F − t
4
=Wc +
∆S2
9t
7.2 Access price’s regulation
When a social planner sets pa, profits are respectively given by the following equations{
pi1 = x1(a1 − f + (p1 − γ)D(p1)) + (1− x1)(pa − C)D(p2)− F
pi2 = (1− x1)(a2 − f + (p2 − c− pa)D(p2))− F
Social welfare is equal to
W = x1(S(p1) + (p1− γ)D(p1)) + (1− x1)(S(p2) + (p2− c−C)D(p2))− t2(x
2
1+ (1− x1)2)− 2F
According to the previous section, social optimum is achieved when the market share of the first
custodian is equal to x∗ = 12 +
∆S
2t with ∆S = S(γ)− S(c+ C), and when per-transaction fees
to the investors are equal to marginal costs p1 = γ and p2 = c+ C.
Under competition, using the same previous argument, the variable fees will be equal to the
marginal costs at a Nash equilibrium : p1 = γ and p2 = c+ pa. The fixed costs must verify the
following equations {
∂pi1
∂a1
= x1 − 12t(a1 − f − (pa − C)D(c+ pa)) = 0
∂pi2
∂a2
= (1− x1)− 12t(a2 − f) = 0
therefore {
a1 = 12(f + t+ a2 + S(γ)− S(c+ pa) + (pa − C)D(c+ pa))
a2 = 12(f + t+ a1 + S(c+ pa)− S(γ))
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so {
a1 = f + t+
S(γ)−S(c+pa)
3 +
2
3(pa − C)D(c+ pa))
a2 = f + t− S(γ)−S(c+pa)3 + 13(pa − C)D(c+ pa))
and the equilibrium market share of custodian 1 is
xpa =
1
2
+
S(γ)− S(c+ pa)
6t
− 1
6t
(pa − C)D(c+ pa)
The derivative of the market share with respect to pa is
∂xpa
∂pa
= − 1
6t
(pa − C)D′(c+ pa)
thus the market share is minimum when pa = C, and it is then equal to
xpa=c =
1
2
+
∆S
6t
where ∆S = S(γ)− S(c+ C).
Let us know find the optimal choice of pa for the social planner. The welfare can be seen as
a function of the three variables p1, p2 and x1. The derivative of the social welfare with respect
to x1, when p1 = γ, p2 = c+ pa and x1 = xpa is
∂W (γ, c+ pa, xpa)
∂x1
= t− 2tx+ S(γ)− S(c+ pa)− (pa − C)D(c+ pa) = 4txpa − 2t ≥ 0
thus, the derivative of the social welfare with respect to pa is
∂W (γ, c+ pa, xpa)
∂pa
= (pa − C)D′(c+ pa)(1− xpa −
4txpa − 2t
6t
) = (pa − c)D′(c+ pa)(43 −
5
3
xpa)
When the transportation costs are high enough, or the custodian’s inefficiency low enough, so
that xpa=c is lower than 80% (which is equivalent to ∆S < 1.8t), then there is a local maximum
at pa = c. On the other hand, when ∆S > 1.8t, then xpa is always higher than 80%, and it is
more optimal to choose pa different than c, in order to exclude in the end the custodian. Even
when ∆S < 1.8t, the point pa = c may not be a global maximum, which would also mean that
the exclusion of the custodian is optimal.
7.3 exclusion of the other custodians
Let’s first assume that the integrated CSD is for profit and non regulated. We consider a mix
Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium : the CSD first chooses pa, then the CSD and the other
custodians compete together by providing tarifs p1 and p2 to the investors, and move toward a
Nash equilibrium. Once a tarif pa is chosen by the CSD, the results of the previous section 7.2
apply. CSD’s profit is given by the following equation
pi1 = x1(a1 − f) + (1− x1)(pa − c)D(c+ pa)
with {
x1 = 12 +
S(c)−S(c+pa)
6t − 16t(pa − c)D(c+ pa)
a1 = f + t+
S(c)−S(c+pa)
3 +
2
3(pa − c)D(c+ pa))
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so
pi1 = x1(a1 − f − (pa − c)D(c+ pa)) + (pa − c)D(c+ pa) = 2tx21 + (pa − c)D(c+ pa)
and simple computation gives the following relation at the optimum
(pa − c)D′(c+ pa)(23xpa − 1) = D(c+ pa)
or
pa − c
c+ pa
=
−D(c+ pa)
(c+ pa)D
′(c+ pa)
× 1
1− 23xpa
The left term of this equation is an increasing function of pa which takes value 0 when pa = c
and tends to 1. The right term is equal to the inverse of the elasticity of quasi-demands time
a factor that is greater than 32 since xpa >
1
2 . Thus, CSD will choose a high access price, and
even exclude the custodian as soon as the elasticity of demand is lower than 1.5.
If the other custodians is excluded, then the market share of the monopolistic CSD is x1 =
S(p1)−a1
t and its profit is maximized when p1 = c1 and
a1 = argmax(
S(c1)− a1
t
(a1 − f)) = S(c1) + f2
Its market share is therefore equal to x1 =
S(c1)−f
2t as long as this value belongs to the interval
[0, 1], and social welfare is equal, when fixed costs are included, to
WICSD = x1(S(c1)− f)− t2x
2
1 − F =
3
8t
(S(c1)− f)2 − F
if x1 < 1 and to
WICSD = S(c1)− f − F − t2
if the CSD serve all the downstream market.
7.4 custodian internalization
Under these assumptions, the market share of CSD on each unit interval is
x0 =
1
2
+
1
2t
(S(p0)− S(p) + a− a0)
If we neglect set-up costs, including those related to setting omnibus accounts for each custodian
inside the CSD, the profits of the CSD and of the custodians are respectively given by :{
pi0 = nx0(a0 − f + (p0 − c)D(p0)) + nα(1− x0)(γ − c)D(p)
pi = (1− x0)(a− f + (p− c− αγ)D(p))
where γ is the variable fee charged by the CSD to each custodian for settling a transaction
through the CSD, and α is the fraction of custodian’s transactions that must be settled through
the CSD. The case α = 1 corresponds to the model analyzed in the previous section.
The profits of the CSD and of the custodians are respectively given by :{
pi0 = nx0(a0 − f + (p0 − c)D(p0)) + nα(1− x0)(γ − c)D(p)
pi = (1− x0)(a− f + (p− c− αγ)D(p))
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Each custodian will choose its fixed tarif in order to maximize its profit, which leads to the
following system of equation :{
∂pi0
∂na0
= x0 − 12t(a0 − f + (p0 − c)D(p0)) + (γ − c)D(p)( 12t − 1−x0nt ) = 0
∂pi
∂a = (1− x0)(1− γD(c+αγ)2nt )− 12t(a− f + (p− c− αγ)D(p)) = 0
since ∂α∂x0 =
1
n ,
∂x0
∂a0
= − 12t and ∂α(1−x0)∂a0 = −1−x02nt + α2t = 12t − 1−x0nt . Using the same argument
as in the previous section, at a Nash equilibrium, the variable fees must once again be equal to
the marginal costs i.e. p0 = c and p = c+ αγ, and this system of equation becomes{
∂pi0
∂na0
= x0 − 12t(a0 − f) + (γ − c)D(c+ αγ)( 12t − 1−x0nt ) = 0
∂pi
∂a = (1− x0)(1− γD(c+αγ)2nt )− 12t(a− f) = 0
Those two equations can be combined in order to obtain a third equation
x0 =
1
2
+
S(c)− S(c+ αγ)
6t
− 1
6t
(γ − c)D(c+ αγ)− 1− x0
3nt
(c− γ
2
)D(c+ αγ)
which defines implicitly the equilibrium market share x0 as a function of γ. Differentiating this
equation, we get
∂x0
∂γ
× (1− γ
6nt
D(c+αγ)+
γ(γ − c)
6nt
D
′
(c+αγ)− c−
γ
2
3nt
D(c+αγ))+
1− x0
3n2t
(c− γ
2
)γD
′
(c+αγ))
= − 1
6t
(γ − c)αD′(c+ αγ) + 1− x0
6nt
D(c+ αγ)− 1− x0
3nt
(c− γ
2
)αD
′
(c+ αγ)
and it is easy to check that, when n is large enough, this derivative at γ = c is strictly positive.
Let us now find wether te optimal value for γ is equal to c or not. Social welfare is equal to
W = n{x0S(c) + (1− x0)(S(c+ αγ) + α(γ − c)D(c+ αγ))− t2(x
2
0 + (1− x0)2)} − 2F
and the maximization of this value depends on the derivative
∂W
n∂γ
= (1− x0)α2(γ − c)D′(c+ αγ)) + ∂x0
∂γ
∂W
n∂x0 |γ=cte
When n tends to infinity, the last term of this equation
∂W
n∂x0
= S(c)−S(c+αγ)−α(γ−c)D(c+αγ))−(1−x0) c
n
D(c+αγ)+(1−x0)αγ
n
(γ−c)D′(c+αγ)+t−2tx0
tends uniformly towards the value obtained when α = 1 in the previous section, i.e. ∂Wn∂x0 |γ=c=
4tx0 − 2t > 0. Consequently, the derivative of the social welfare with respect to γ is strictly
positive at γ = c when n is large enough.
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